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Abstract : The paper studies the ordinal equivalence of Linear, Efficient  and Symmetry 
(LES) values in TU-games. It demonstrates that most of the results obtained by Carreras F, 
Freixas J (2008) in the case of semivalues and simple games are transposable on LES values 
and the whole TU-games set. In particular, linear and weakly linear games are analyzed. We 
characterize both values which are ordinal equivalent in all TU-games. Pigou-Dalton transfers 
are introduced for social comparison of values and to shed light on the way payoffs are 
redistributed from a value to another.  
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1. Introduction and notations 
 
A transferable utility game (or cooperative game or coalitional game with side pay-ments or 
simply a TU-game) is a pair      , where   is a finite set of at least two players and   
           a characteristic function satisfying      = 0. An element of   and a nonempty 
subset   of   is called a player and coalition respectively, and the real number      is called 
the worth of coalition  . For a fixed   of cardinality  , we denote        the set of  all 
transferable utility games   on  .  
For each game in      , we consider the complete preordering induced in the set of players 
by the application of values. A value on       is a function     that assigns a single payoff 
vector                
  to every game        From the multiplicity of value in 
cooperative games it follows that comparisons between these values should be made. In some 
context the amount of gain given to a player in a game by a value may be less important than 
the  rank  assigned to the player, so that it is sufficient to base the comparison on the 
corresponding preordering instead of the numerical amount provided by each value. Both 
values are said to be ordinal equivalent in a game if their corresponding preordering coincide. 
The interest in ordinal equivalence of indices in cooperative games starts with the work of 
Tomiyama Y. (1987) who proved that, for every weighted majority game, the Shapley–
Shubik (1954) and Penrose–Banzhaf–Coleman preorderings coincide. Next, Diffo Lambo and 
Moulen (2002) extended Tomiyama’s result to all linear simple games. More recently, 
Carreras F, Freixas J (2008) extended Diffo Lambo and Moulen’s results, in two senses: to all 
regular semivalues and to a large class of weakly linear simple games. 
 
Throughout this paper we focus on the class, denoted LES, of values that satisfy linearity, 
symmetry and efficiency. A value   on      is said to be linear if              
                  for all games      ,      , for all player     and for all      . 
  on    is symmetric if  for all games       and for any automorphism   of  ,         
          . Finally a value    on  
  posses the efficiency property if                 .  
Obviously, the class of LES values is very large and includes, among others, the Shapley 
value (1953) and the solidarity value (Nowak and Radzik, 1994) which differ of their payoffs 
from social considerations. However, it seems important to characterize and evaluate how 
large is the class of games in which both values preserve the same rank among the players. 
The parametrization of LES values is the core topic in papers by Ruiz et al. (1998), 
Hernandez-Lamoneda et al. (2008), Chameni-Nembua and Andjiga (2008), more recently 
Chameni-Nembua (2012) and Malawski (2012) put forward a more economic interpretational 
one. 
 
The aim of this paper is to study the ordinal equivalence of LES values not only in the case of 
simple games but when all TU-games are considered. It is shown that, most of the results 
obtained by Carreras F, Freixas J (2008) in the case of semi-values and simple games are 
transposable in the whole TU-games set and LES values. It is also shown that, two LES 
values are ordinal equivalent in all TU-game if and only if one is a positive convex 
combination of the second and the Egalitarian value. Next, for social comparison of LES 
values, we introduce Pigou-Dalton’s progressive transfers (1912-1920). A sufficient condition 
is established to obtain, in weakly linear games, the payoffs of a LES value as Pigou-Dalton 
progressive transfer from another. Due to Symmetry and Linearity property of values, the 
sequences of progressive transfers obtained are selective and closer to the concept of 
concentration, which is a particular type of redistribution studied by kolm (1999) and Udo 
Ebert (2009, 2010).      
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The paper is organized as follows. The present section introduces the paper and reminds some 
basic definitions and results on LES values. Section 2 is concerned with ordinal equivalence 
of two values in the whole set of TU-games. While section 3 is devoted to the study of linear 
games, section 4 deals with the ordinal equivalence of LES values in the class of weakly 
linear games. Section 5 addresses the issue of obtaining the payoffs of a value from Pigou-
Dalton progressive transfer of another value.  Finally, the paper is concluded in section 6.  
 
Theorem 1.1.  Consider a set of player   of cardinality   and       the set of  all transferable 
utility games   on  . Then the following statement, for a value   on        re equivalent:  
 
(i)   is LES 
 
(ii) There exists a unique sequence of     real number        
    such that, for any 
       
 
          
    
 
       
            
  
         
          
  
         
   
        (1.1) 
 
(iii) There exists a unique sequence of     real number        
  such that, for any     
and for any      , if   (S) =                     
        
 
          
          
        
    
 
    
          
       
  (S)                                                     (1.2) 
 
We refer the reader to [Hernandez and ali. 2008 ; Chameni 2012] for the proof of the theorem. 
While the parameterization given by (1.1) is hardly interpretable, Chameni (2012) proposes to 
interpret   (S) defined in (1.2) as follow.When player   joins   to form    , he/she receives 
                      which, when         [0, 1], may be seen as a fraction of 
his/her marginal contribution while the incumbents in   receive the rest in equal shares. When 
player   joins        to form    , incumbent   receives additional individual 
share 
        
 
             . Thus   (S) is  ’s conditional expected payoff given 
formation of   by the addition of any one player. 
 
An additional remark here is the link between the two sequences. It is easy to check that, 
                                                                                                   (1.3) 
 
Another classical property yields the relationship about the difference between the value 
payoffs of two players. 
 
Lemme 1.2 Consider two distinct players   and   in  . If    is any LES value on      , then 
for all TU-game      , 
                      
          
           
                                (1.4) 
 
Definition 1.3 A LES value   on        is considered to be: 
-  Regular whenever the associated sequence        
    or        
  are all strictly positive 
real. 
- Semi-regular whenever the associated sequence        
    or        
  are all positive or 
nil real. 
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- Strict semi-regular whenever the associated sequence        
    or        
  are all 
positive or nil real with some of them strictly positive. 
 
 
Note that, the regularity of a value implies its strict semi-regularity which implies its semi-
regularity.  Most of the classical values such as Shapley value, Solidarity value and 
Consensus (Yuan Ju, and P. Ruys 2007) value are regular. But the Egalitarian value   that 
allocates the same payoff to every player in all game       in that,         
    
 
, is neither 
regular nor strict semi-regular but semi-regular as its associated sequence is       
                     .   Also, the so called Equal Surplus (or CIS) value (Driessen 
and Funaki, 1991)  is not regular but strict semi-regular as                 and         
   for           .                                                  
 
 
2. Ordinal equivalence of LES Values 
 
In this section, we first provide the requirement condition for both LES values to be ordinal 
equivalent. 
 
Definition 2.1 Let       be a TU-game, consider two values         on      .        
are said to be ordinal equivalent in the game       if  for all      , 
                  iff                   and                  iff          
       . 
       are ordinal equivalent  iff they are ordinal equivalent  in all TU-game      . 
 
We remark that egalitarian value   is a singular case as it admits no ordinal equivalent value 
but itself. When a value   is different from  , it seems important to characterize the class of 
all values   such that        are ordinal equivalent; the next theorem deals with this issue.  
 
Theorem 2.1 .  Consider a set of players   of cardinality   and      the set of  all 
transferable utility games   on  . Then the following statements for two LES value         
on       are equivalent:  
 
1)     and   (different from  ) are ordinal equivalent. 
 
2) Their associated sequence         
    and         
                
                   
   
defined by (1.1) or (1.2) are positively proportional i.e. there exists  a strict positive 
real constant   such that               for all              
 
3) There exists a strict positive constant   such that                       
    
 
  
for all TU-game      and for all      
 
 
Proof. 1)    
Consider two distinct players     in  , for coalitions   and   such that   ,          , we 
define the games       and       as:  
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According to (1.4),                                                ; 
thus for the value   , 
                  
  and   ordinal equivalent implies                  ,  
therefore,                                 .  
Since the relation is valid for all   and for all   from         , we obtain: 
 
                            for all  =1,2,…,n-1 and for all  =1,2,…,n-1.      (1.5) 
 
Suppose        ,  then from (1.5),               for all  =1,2,…,n-1. 
 if           for all  =1,2,…,n-1, then    ; else       = 0; 
Suppose        , then from (1.5),        
      
     
       for all  =1,2,…,n-1. 
Hence, the both sequences    and    are proportional i.e. there exist a constant     such 
that             ,  =1,2,…,n-1. 
To see that c is a strict positive constant, we use the game      . 
                         =                             
Since   and    are ordinal equivalent,                 and                have 
the same sign and consequently c is positive constant. 
 
2)    
Suppose that              for all  =1,2,…,n-1, then from (1.1) 
 
         
    
 
        
            
  
         
          
  
         
   
    
 
             = 
    
 
 +         
            
  
         
          
  
         
   
     
    
 
  
    
 
 
 
            =      
    
 
 +  
    
 
          
            
  
         
          
  
         
   
     
 
              =        
    
 
          
 
3)    Obvious because   is a strict positive affine transformation of  .   
 
Applying the theorem in the particular case of the Shapley value yields the following result. 
 
Corollary 2.2 :  Consider a set of players   of cardinality   and      the set of  all 
transferable utility games   on  . Then the following statement for a LES value     on 
       are equivalent :  
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1)     and the Shapley value         are ordinal equivalent. 
 
2) The   associated sequence        
    or         
    defined by (1.1) or (1.2) is a strict 
positive constant. 
 
3) There exists a strict positive constant   such that,  
           
               
    
 
  for all TU-game      and for all      
 
When the constant   lies between 0 and 1,                 is called the egalitarian 
Shapley value (Joosten 1996). This case has been recurrently studies in the literature and 
different authors (Nowak, A.S., and T. Radzik, (1996); Dragan, I., Driessen, T.S.H., and Y. 
Funaki, (1996)) propose different characterizations of the egalitarian Shapley value. Here we 
consider the redistribution of gain and introduce the concept of Pigou-Dalton transfer that is a 
well-known criterion in Economic inequality theory.    
 
Definition 2.3 Let       be a TU-game, consider two values         on      .    is said to 
be obtained from   , in the game        by a progressive Pigou-Dalton transfer if  
1-     and   are ordinal equivalent in the game      ; 
2- there are       ,     such that                 for     ,     and 
                                                   . 
 It will be noted                    to say that   is obtained from , in the game 
       by a combination of progressive Pigou-Dalton transfers, while         means that 
the property holds in all game      . 
   
 
Clearly, a progressive Pigou-Dalton transfer from a value   corresponds to a rank-preserving 
transfer of gain from a richer player to a poorer one. In particular, it requires the same 
treatment for two players having the same amount of gain relatively to the value . 
 
Theorem 2.4: Consider a set of players   of cardinality   and      the set of all transferable 
utility games   on  . Then the following statements for two LES values         on 
      are equivalent:  
1)         
2) There exists a strict positive constant          such that  
                      
    
 
  for all TU-game      and for all       
  
Proof.  
        implies in particular that   and   are ordinal equivalent. In the view of 
theorem 2.1, there exist a constant     such that                       
    
 
  for 
all game       and for all player    . 
Suppose that    , setting        implies                           
    
 
  
therefore,         is obtained from         as follow: 
 If         
    
 
   then          is increased and the amount increased is 
proportional to the distance between         and the average  
    
 
 . 
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  If         
    
 
  then         is decreased and the diminished amount is 
proportional to the distance between         and the average 
    
 
. 
Of course, this sort of allocation is in contradiction with the Pigou-Dalton transfer. Hence 
        . 
Conversely, if         , setting                leads to 
                                      
    
 
          
Thus         is obtained from         as follow: 
 If         
    
 
 then        is decreased and the diminished amount is 
proportional to the distance between         and the average 
    
 
. 
 If         
    
 
  then          is increased and the amount increased is 
proportional to the distance between         and the average  
    
 
 . 
This kind of allocation is a particular case of a series of  Pigou-Dalton transfer.    
 
Clearly, the only ordinal equivalent values to a LES value   are those obtained as positive 
convex combinations of   with the egalitarian value  . Economic interpretation of such a 
value needs to shed more light on the convex combination terms. 
When                        
    
 
  with     , and for all    , two cases may 
appear.  
If,        , setting                 and re-arrange the terms leads to 
 
                        
    
 
                                         (1.6) 
 
In this case, from theorem 2.4 it follows that    is obtained from , by a series of progressive 
transfers. In the light of (1.6), as consequences of linearity and symmetry, the concern 
transfers are in such a way that all payoff move toward the average payoff 
    
 
 . The poor 
(here, players with payoff less than 
    
 
 ) receive an equiproportional increasing of the 
distance between their payoff and the average payoff  
    
 
   while the payoff of the rich 
(players with payoff greater than 
    
 
 )  decrease and move in the opposite way. In the 
literature, such a situation is qualified, when analyzing economic inequality, as concentration. 
A concentration
1
 is a kind of redistribution of payoff which reduces the gap between each 
payoff and the average payoff in the same proportion. Of course, a concentration is a 
particular combination of progressive Pigou–Dalton transfers. Thus, for any good inequality 
measure   satisfying Pigou–Dalton transfer principle2 we have                  
                  
 
If     , a similar manipulation leads to   
                                                          
1
 We refer the reader to Udo Ebert (2010, 2009) for more details on the topic. 
 
2
 Most of classical inequality indices such as Entropy family of indices (Cowell F.A. 1980), the standard Gini 
(1916) index and the   Gini family (Chameni Nembua 2006; Elbert  U. 2010) of indices satisfy the Pigou-
Dalton transfer principle which requires that a rank-preserving transfer of income from a richer individual to a 
poorer one decreases inequality. 
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 . 
 Henceforth,   is obtained from   by equiproportional increasing of the distance between 
each gains and the average gain  
    
 
 of rich players. Socially considerations might accuse   
for being anti redistributive i.e. benefiting the rich at the expense of the poor. 
 
Unfortunately, for a given value , the class of ordinal equivalence value is very thin as it is 
restrict to positive convex combinations of   with the egalitarian value  . To remedy this and 
enlarge the class, in the following sections, the condition of “all game” is relaxed and two 
particular categories of games are investigated. 
 
3. The desirability relation and linear games 
 
To start with, for any LES value   on     , we denote    the complete preordering induces 
by   in   in that,        iff                   and         iff                 . 
Note that, the ordinal equivalence of two values corresponds to the coincidence of their 
preordering. 
 
Définition 3.1: let       be a TU-game and consider in   the so called desirability binary 
relation defined as: 
                        j iff                for all          . 
 
Isbell JR (1958) proved that the desirability relation    is a preordering in   There are many 
games of interest in which    turn out to be complete, but this is not generally the rule. 
 
Definition 3.2: A TU-game       is said to be linear whenever the desirability relation    is 
a complete preordering.  
 
For example any unanimity game is linear, and generally any weighted simple game is linear. 
 
The following result holds. 
 
Proposition 3.3: Let       be any linear game, then for any regular value   on     , the 
preordering     and the desirability preordering coincide. 
In other words, any two regular values        on       are ordinal equivalent in all linear 
game        
 
Proof. 
      linear     is a complete preordering in       
                     for all            
          
 
       
          
 
      for all             
          
 
             
          
 
              for all           and 
for all            
          
           
                        
       for all regular value  . 
                       for all           with               for 
some  , then applying the same process straightforward leads to        for all regular 
value.  
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Notice that, from the first part of the proof of the proposition 3.3, it is clear that, in a linear 
game     ,      implies      for all semi regular value  . But the coincidence of     
and     becomes awkward.  
The converse of the assertion in the proposition 3.3 is not true in the sense that, a game in 
which all regular value are ordinal equivalent is not necessary a linear game. However, as we 
will see, the property is true if    . 
To remedy this, we propose to enlarge the class of linear games by replacing the linearity 
property of game with a weaker one. But before tackle the issue, let us introduce the class of 
strongly linear games in order to take into account the ordinal equivalence of strict semi-
regular values. 
 
Definition3.4: let       be a TU-game and consider in   the strong desirability binary 
relation    defined in  as:   
 
       First, the strict preordering:                                 
                                     iff  
                                          for all           and  
                            for all     n-2 there exists        such that                 
 
         Second, the equivalence:           
                                    iff 
                                                 for all          . 
  
Then,        iff         or       
    
 
 
It is straightforward to check that     is a preordering in   so that one may follow the linear 
game definition approach to obtain the so called strongly linear game. Furthermore,     is a 
sub-preordering of    in the sense that            and              . 
 
Definition 3.5: A TU-game       is said to be strongly linear whenever the strong 
desirability relation     is a complete preordering.  
 
It is clear that the strong linearity of a game implies it linearity but the converse is not true, so 
that the class of strongly linear games is narrow compare to the class of linear games. This 
justifies the reason that the term “strong” is used.  
For example the game       with    : 
                ;                              ;            
       is linear :        but not strongly linear          and      . 
 
Proposition 3.6: Let       be any strongly linear game, then for any strict semi-regular value 
  on     , the preordering     and the strong desirability preordering coincide. 
In other words, any both strict semi-regular values   and   on       are ordinal equivalent 
in all strongly linear game        
 
Proof 
      strongly linear      is a complete preordering in      . 
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                      for all           and for all   there exist at least 
one   with       such that              . 
 
    
          
 
       
          
 
       for all           and for all   with the 
strict inequality for at least one  . 
 
          
 
             
          
 
              for all            
and for all          with the strict inequality for at least one  . 
 
  
          
           
                               for all strict 
semi- regular value  . 
                        for all          , then applying the same process 
straightforward leads to        for all strict semi-regular value.   
 
 
4. The weak desirability relation and the weakly linear games 
 
We introduce an entity which reflects the importance level of a player in the game; the entity 
may also be interpreted as the player productivity in the game. To this purpose, we define, for 
a given TU-game      , for each player      and for all        , the quantity,  
           
                                            and                            
 
In words,        is the sum of worth of all coalition size   containing the player  , while      
is the vector of      whose components  are respectively      . Clearly, the process defines 
a function          therefore the binary relation       iff             is a 
preordering in   that is not always complete. The equivalence and the strict preordering 
induced by    are:         iff             for all               and         iff  
            for all                but             for some  .   
   
Definition 4.1: let       be a TU-game and consider in   the so called weak desirability 
preordering relation defined as: 
                                         j  iff        
 
Following the definition process of the linear games, we use the weak desirability relation to 
define a new class of TU-games. 
 
Definition 4.2: A TU-game       is said to be weakly linear whenever the weak desirability 
relation     is a complete preordering.  
 
Note that definition 4.2 is an extension to all TU-games of the weakly linearity defined by 
Carreras F, Freixas J (2008) in the case of simple games. 
 
The following lemma elucidates the reason that the term “weakly” is used as it asserts that, 
the completeness of the desirability relation (linearity of the game) implies the completeness 
of the weak desirability relation, so that the second condition is weaker than the former one. 
 
Lemma 4.3: let       be a TU-game and   be any regular value on      then: 
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1) The desirability relation    is a sub-preordering of  the weak desirability preordering 
    in that:       j             and                   . 
In particular, if    is complete, so is      and the both preordering coincide. 
 
2)       linear implies that       is weakly linear but the converse is true only when 
   . 
 
3) The weak desirability relation is a sub-preordering of the complete preordering    
induced by   in . 
 
Proof.  
1)  Consider a TU-game       and      , 
          for all          ,                for all  ,  for all     
      with        ,               therefore,  for a fixed   
              =               
   
 +               
   
=                  
   
 +               
   
 
                  
   
 +               
   
               
   
 +               
   
               . 
Hence          
 
         for all          ,               with               for 
some  . 
  for all  ,  for all           with        ,               with 
              for some  . 
Thus, The same operations clearly lead to        . 
     complete       and the both preordering coincide is straightforward as    is a 
sub-preordering of     . 
 
2)       linear     is complete in      , according to 1) this implies      is 
complete in              is weakly linear. 
 
The converse is true only when      : 
 If     , suppose that            , then                 ,               
       thus,  
    
             
   
    
             
   
    
             
   
                            
 
 If    , let, for instance,        be the game defined as:  
                                
        ;                                                       
                                                  
                                           =      and  
                                        otherwise. 
It is clear that       is not linear since           and              , thus player 
2 and player 1 are not comparable and therefore     is not complete. 
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Thus, 4                            . Hence,       is 
weakly linear but not linear. 
 
3) As                  +               =               +               for all k and 
for all      ,  
           for all  , 
                              
   
                             
   
   
 As   is a regular value, its associated sequence        
     satisfies        for all  , hence 
 
  for all  ,  
            
  
                   
            
  
                   
   
 
          
  
                    
          
  
                  
  
 
 
            
  
                   –
          
  
                    
 
  
            
  
                    
          
  
                    for all  ,  
 
  
            
  
         
         
 –
          
  
         
         
 
   
   
 
 
   
            
  
          
         
 
          
  
         
         
 
   
   
 
 
  From (1.1),                  
 
 
The same process clearly proves that                    
 
 
Remark 4.4: Notice that, from the third part of the proof of the Lemma 4.3, it follows that, if 
  is a semi-regular value then               . But     is not necessary a sub-
preordering of    as it is not true that                   .       
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Proposition 4.5: let       be a TU-game of       that is linear then: 
      is weakly linear and the desirability relation    , the weak desirability relation 
    and the complete preordering   induce by any regular value   on      coincide. 
 
Proof. As       is linear,     is complete, according to lemma4.3 it coincides with      
which is then complete. From proposition3.3, if   is any regular value,   and    coincide, 
thus    and      coincide.  
 
We can now state the first characterization of the weakly linear game. 
 
Theorem 4.6: let       be a TU-game of       , if we set for any player     and for any 
       ,                        
                                   
            
  
               
          
  
                    (1.7) 
 
          And                                     
    
 
Then, 
1)          iff       .  In word,      and    coincide. 
 
2)       is weakly linear iff      ,   and    the complete preordering induced by each   
regular value  , coincide. 
 
3) If for all k,     coincide then       is weakly linear but the converse is not true. 
 
Proof. 
 
1)       
            
  
               
          
  
                
          =  
            
  
               
          
  
                            
          = 
              
      
                
          
  
           
Hence, for any      ,             
              
      
              
Which proves the property. 
 
2) Suppose that       is weakly linear, then from the lemma 4.3,      coincides 
with the complete preordering   . 
Conversely, if the weak desirability relation coincides with the complete 
preordering    induced by a regular value  , then     is complete and hence 
      is weakly linear     
 
3) Obvious from 1)                                                                                                        
 
  
Remark 4.7:  From the first part of theorem 4.6, it follows that, for any TU-game       , for 
any players      , and for any LES value   , 
              
    
 
 +           
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                    
                                
   
      =    
              
      
                  
   
     
 
  From the theorem 4.6, we can straightforwardly withdraw the following results. 
 
Corollary 4.8: let       be a TU-game of        
 
1) If the weak desirability relation coincide with the preordering    induced by a given 
LES value   (regular or not), then       is weakly linear. 
 
2) The weak linearity of        does not imply the coincidence of weak desirability 
relation      with      for a  particular LES value.  
 
Note that the second assertion of the corollary is particularly true for a semi-regular but non 
regular value. 
 
The following theorem deals with the second characterization of the weakly linear games. 
 
Theorem 4.9: let       be a TU-game of       then, 
      is weakly linear iff  all regular values are ordinal equivalent in      . 
 
Proof. 
        weakly linear       coincides with    for each   regular value   (theorem 
4.5). 
 Conversely, suppose that       coincides with     for all regular value  and let us 
assume that        is not weakly linear. Then there exist two distinct players   and 
  such that       and      . Hence there exist   and   such that                
and               .  For any      , we consider two LES values    and   with 
corresponding sequence          
     and           
   s such that: 
 
        
  
              
                    
  
              
            
     
 
          
  
              
                    
  
              
            
   
 
Then in the view of remark 4.7,  
 
                   
              
      
                   
   
      
 
          = 
              
      
                   
   
    +
              
      
                    
 
          =                
   
    +                   
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Thus, when   tends toward 0, the sign of                    is the same as the 
sign of              , therefore,                           . 
 As      coincides with    for all LES value , we obtain      . 
Using the same process and compute                    leads to 
                           ,  thus we obtain         and then directly fall 
into a contradiction.  
 
Theorem4.9 is silent about the semi-regular and strict semi-regular values, to remedy this, we 
now introduce the strict weakly linear games. We need firstly to define the strict weak 
desirability preordering. 
 
Definition 4.10: let       be a TU-game and consider in   the strict weak desirability 
relation      defined in  as:   
 
       First, the strict preordering:                                  
                  iff                                                           for all     n-1 
          
     Second, the equivalence:               iff                      for all     n-1 
                                    
Then,         iff          or          
 
 
It is immediate that      is a preordering in   which is a sub-preordering of     in the 
sense that              and                . 
Secondly, we define a strict weakly linear game as the one where the strict weak desirability 
relation is a complete preordering. Then the following results hold. 
 
 
Theorem 4.11: let       be a TU-game of       then, 
      is strict weakly linear iff  all strict semi-regular values are ordinal equivalent in      . 
 
Proof. Suppose that       is strict weakly linear and consider a strict semi-regular value . 
                           for all     n-1 
                                         for all     n-1 with the strict inequality 
for some    
                                 
   
              
   
    
                  
    
 
             
   
   
    
 
            
   
    
                                
 
 It is easy to check that                         
 
Henceforth,      and    coincide for all strict semi-regular value . 
 
  Conversely, consider     strict semi-regular value   such as 
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for all     n-1     are all ordinal equivalent in      . Thus for any       , we have  
                                       =               
  Since                     have a constant sign for all  , it implies that 
                 have a constant sign for all   and for all         
  Thus       is strict weakly linear.  
 
Corollary 4.12: let       be a TU-game of      , then 
                        is strict weakly linear iff     coincide for all    
 
 
5. Pigou-Dalton transfers in weakly linear games  
 
This section shed light on the way payoffs are redistributed from a value to another ordinal 
equivalent value in weakly linear games.  
 
Proposition 5.1: Let       be any weakly linear game and suppose that players are 
numbered such that,                     Consider two strict semi-regular values 
        on      with associated sequences         
    and          
   . 
   If              for all          then 
  There exists a sequence             
  and    such that: 
                                                        
 
          With,          for   =1,…,    ; 
                           for   =1,…,   ;          for   all     ;       
                                            
 
      
 
 
Proof. Suppose that              for all          with              for 
some  , thus there exist a real positive sequence          
    such that  
                          for all          with         for some  . 
Denote   the LES value whose (1.1) sequence is          
   , it is clear that   is strict 
semi-regular value (different from the egalitarian value  ) and hence, in the view of  
remark 4.4, for any two players                     . 
Consider that,  
                            
    
 
 +           
   
    
Then, 
        
    
 
                   
   
     
 
= 
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Setting     
    
 
         , it is obvious that: 
         for all              as    is semi-regular.  
       and    0. 
      
 
    as   is efficient.  
 Therefore there exist    such that      for      and     0 for     . 
                                                                                 
         
Corollary 5.2: Let       be any weakly linear game and suppose that players are numbered 
such that,                     Consider two strict semi-regular values         on 
      satisfying              for all          then, 
 
1)         
 
            
 
    for all      . 
i.e.  generalized Lorenz dominates   in       
 
2)  
       
    
 
     
       
    
 
       for all         in the case        
i.e.  relative Lorenz dominates   in      
 
3)                                       for all        . 
i.e   dominates   in absolute differentials in      
 
4) If           ,      
       
         
 
       
         
    for all        . 
 i.e   dominates   in relative differentials in      
 
Proof 
1)         
 
            
 
               
 
   +   
 
   . 
      Thus, we only need to prove that    
 
      for all      . 
 If        , then      hence,   
 
      
 If     , then    
 
       
  
       
 
      
    
  
       
 
      
  . 
 
2) Obvious from 1) 
3)                                                  . The results holds 
since            
4) 
       
         
 
          
              
 
 
These results clearly demonstrate the effect on inequality of a decrease in the coefficients 
       
    . It is well-known that the Lorenz dominance implies there is a series of progressive 
Pigou-Dalton transfers. The next theorem deals with this repercussion.  
 
Theorem 5.3: Let       be any weakly linear game, and consider two distinct strict semi-
regular values         on         
If their associated sequences         
    and         
    are such that              for all 
        , then  
                                           . 
    
The converse of the theorem 5.3 assertion is not true. It is easy to find a       weakly linear 
game and both regular values         with                   but the condition 
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             for all         does not hold. In particular, if       is such that for 
some s,                is independent to player  ,      , for any LES value , has no impact 
on the computation of         , hence a change in the amount of       changes nothing on 
       . However, in a weakly linear game,                   arrives only if 
             for at least one s. 
Another interesting comment here is about the comparison of Shapley value and Solidarity 
value. It is well-kwon that they are respectively characterized by the sequence         and 
     
 
   
  for all        . Therefore, in a weakly linear game, Solidarity value not 
only Lorenz dominates Shapley value but also, it is always obtained from the Shapley value 
by a combination of Pigou-Dalton progressive transfers. This gives other reasons to consider 
the Solidarity value as more social behavior than Shapley value. 
 
6.   Concluding  Remark 
 
The paper has studied the ordinal equivalence of Linear, Efficient  and Symmetry (LES) 
values in TU-games. Most of the results established in the case of semi-values and simple 
games have been re-obtained, in particular when the linear and weakly linear games are 
considered. The paper has characterized both values that are ordinal equivalent in all TU-
games as values such that one is a positive convex combination of the other and the 
Egalitarian value. This therefore completely solves the problem of the ordinal equivalence of 
LES values in TU-games. Applying this result, we obtain for example that, Shapley value and 
Solidarity value are not ordinal equivalent in all TU-games and thus open the problem of 
finding the largest class of games in which the ordinal equivalence of both values holds. 
Pigou-Dalton transfers have been introduced for social comparison of values and to shed light 
on the way payoffs are redistributed from a value to another.  
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